Sunday, November 30, 2014

Simons Institute at Berkeley: semester on Economics and Computation

Noam Nisan writes

Simons Semester on Economics and Computation

The Simons institute at Berkeley will be having a semester on Economics and Computation in Fall 2015 (Aug 19 – Dec 18, 2015).
The Simons institute is awarding research fellowships for participation in this semester!   These Fellowships are intended for “exceptional young scientists (within at most six years of the award of their PhD at the start of academic year 2015-16)”. In addition, the Institute co-hosts joint fellowships in which a fellow spends a period (typically one semester) as a Simons-Berkeley Fellow and is also appointed to a postdoctoral position at a partner institution.
The deadline for applications is near: December 15, 2014.
Judging from past semesters (on other topics), this is going to be the place to be for researchers in the area during that semester

Saturday, November 29, 2014

Kidney exchange in Australia passes the 100 transplant mark

"In September the Paired Kidney Exchange Program reached the milestone of 100 transplants."

Here's the story, focused on a six-way chain:
Six-way kidney transplant boosts altruistic donor rates
by Lucie Van Den Berg, Herald Sun, November 22, 2014

Friday, November 28, 2014

Bride price and the education of brides

Here's a new paper that casts bride price in a somewhat different light, with data from Indonesia and Zambia suggesting that girls who grow up in communities with bride price receive more education than those who grow up in similar communities that don't have bride price:

Bride Price and the Returns to Education, by Nava Ashraf, Natalie Bau, Nathan Nunn, and  Alessandra Voena.  November 16, 2014

Traditional cultural practices can play an important role in development, but can also inspire condemnation. The custom of bride price, prevalent throughout sub-Saharan Africa and in parts of Asia as a payment of the groom to the family of the bride, is one example. In this paper, we show a surprising economic consequence of this practice. We revisit one of the best-studied historical development projects, the INPRES school construction program in Indonesia, and show that previously found null results on female enrollment mask heterogeneity by bride price tradition. Ethnic groups that traditionally engage in bride price payments at marriage increased female enrollment in response to the program. Within these ethnic groups, higher female education at marriage is associated with a higher bride price payment received, providing a greater incentive for parents to invest in girls' education and take advantage of the increased supply of schools. For those girls belonging to ethnic groups that do not practice bride price, we see no increase in education following school construction. We replicate these same findings in Zambia, where we exploit a similar school expansion program that took place in the early 2000s. While there may be significant downsides to a bride price tradition, our results suggest that any change to this cultural custom should likely be considered alongside additional policies to promote female education.

Thursday, November 27, 2014

Job market for new Ph.d. economists

A recent NBER working paper discusses the job market for economists:

Brooke Helppie McFall
Marta Murray-Close
Robert J. Willis
Uniko Chen
Working Paper 20654
November 2014

This paper describes the job market experiences of new PhD economists, 2007-10. Using information from PhD programs' job candidate websites and original surveys, the authors present information about job candidates' characteristics, preferences and expectations; how job candidates fared at each stage of the market; and predictors of outcomes at each stage. Some information presented in this paper updates findings of prior studies. However, design features of the data used in this paper may result in more generalizable findings. This paper is unique in comparing pre-market expectations and preferences with post-market outcomes on the new PhD job market. It shows that outcomes tend to align with pre-market preferences, and candidates' expectations are somewhat predictive of their outcomes. Several analyses also shed light on sub-group differences.

some interesting paragraphs:

"During the job-market seasons covered by this study, job candidates submitted 107 applications, completed 17 interviews and 6 fly-outs, and received 3 job offers on average. Our findings show a dramatic increase in applications compared to List (2000), who found the average job seeker in his convenience sample had scheduled just seven interviews prior to the AEA meetings in 1997.xvii It is likely that the decreased cost of finding openings and submitting applications associated with of the growth of internet job listings and web-based applications have changed norms since the late 1990s. "(p9)

"Positions in business and industry tend to be the highest paid, at $110,100 on average, while postdoctoral fellowships, the lowest-paid category, average just $57,500. The average salary for a four-year college position is $72,400, while the average new assistant professor’s salary at a university is $96,500 per year. " (p16)

Wednesday, November 26, 2014

Jacob Lavee on preventing transplant tourism, in the birthplace of transplantation

Jacob Lavee, about whom I've written numerous posts, was just in Boston as the 8th Annual Joseph E. Murray Visiting Professor in Transplant Surgery, to speak about "Preventing transplant tourism: A personal voyage which shaped the Organ Transplant Law in Israel."

Tuesday, November 25, 2014

A new market for blog posts?

Kim Krawiec is on top of the taboo trades game, and has some new ones to suggest: I particularly like the idea that if you have some fact that requires a citation, maybe we could arrange that...

Selling The Starred Footnote

I’m late to the game in blogging about this, but I just found out about it on Friday at a conference on the Ethical Limits of Markets hosted by the Institute For The Study of Markets and Ethics at Georgetown University’s McDonough School of Business (about which I’ll have more to say later).  Jason Brennan and Peter Jaworski are selling acknowledgements in the preface of their book Markets without Limits, which will be published by Routledge Press, most likely in late 2015 or early 2016.
The book answers the question “Are there some things which you permissibly may possess, use, and give away, but which are wrong to buy and sell?” in the negative, in contrast to the numerous books already written on the topic which take the contrary position.  Brennan and Jaworski are selling three tiers of acknowledgements: Silvermint Tier, Platinum Tier, and Gold Tier (The Silvermint Tier is so named because philosophy and women’s studies professorDaniel Silvermint is paying to have the highest tier named after him.)
Wish I had thought of that!  But no reason I can’t adopt it going forward.  In addition, I’ve decided to sell links to and mentions of your work in my blog posts and tweets.  I’m still working out the exact fee schedule, but will charge extra for highly positive mentions and even more for highly negative mentions (as controversy is always an attention getter). Finally, if those pesky law review editors won’t stop bothering you for support that you can’t find, just let me know and I’ll sell you a blog post setting out the needed statements, to which you can then cite. 
We often complain that student editors demand support for obviously correct statements of common knowledge – indeed, it is sometimes the case that the proposition is so widely known and accepted that it is difficult to find discussion of the point in print.  For example, you may want to reference the uncontroversial view that “professors of market regulation are considered smarter and more interesting than professors of constitutional law,” yet struggle to find something in print to that effect (in contrast to the faculty lounge and hallway conversations in which this assertion is frequently found). Problem solved!  Just let me know the statements for which you need a citation and I’ll post them here for a fee.  The profit possibilities on this one are nearly endless. 

Monday, November 24, 2014

Stanford Engineering Hero Lecture: Ken Arrow on his intellectual history and the history of Operations Research (video)

I've had occasion to think about Operations Research recently, and it's relationships with Economics.  Here's Ken Arrow recalling some early history.

Ken speaks about his intellectual history, and the history of Operations Research as a field and at Stanford. The question and answers at the end are a lot of fun too.

Ken's talk begins at around 7:30 of the video, after an introduction.
The occasion is the March 4, 2014 celebration of Ken as an Engineering Hero. 

Sunday, November 23, 2014

on my reading list (but not yet read)--recent papers on school choice, resident matching, and kidney exchange

Ulrich Kamecke 

Humboldt University of Berlin - Faculty of Economics

September 29, 2014

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 4969 


We model centralized school matching as a second stage of a simple Tiebout-model and show that the two most discussed mechanisms, the deferred acceptance and the Boston algorithm, both produce inefficient outcomes and that the Boston mechanism is more efficient than deferred acceptance. This advantage vanishes if the participants get to know their priorities before they submit their preferences. Moreover, the mechanism creates artificial social segregation at the cost of the disadvantaged if the school priorities are based on ex ante known (social) differences of the applicants.

The History and Rationale of the American Urological Association Residency Matching Program

  • Steven J. Weissbart
  • Jeffrey A. Stock

  • A new perspective on Kesten's school choice with consent idea 

    Abstract We revisit the school choice problem with consent proposed by Kesten [12], which seeks to improve the efficiency of the student-optimal deferred acceptance algorithm (DA) by obtaining students' consent to give up their priorities. We observe that for students to consent, we should use their consent only when their assignments are Pareto unimprovable. Inspired by this perspective, we propose a new algorithm which iteratively reruns DA after removing students who have been matched with underdemanded schools, together with their assignments. While this algorithm is outcome equivalent to Kesten's EADAM, it is more accessible to practitioners due to its computational simplicity and transparency on consenting incentives. We also adapt this algorithm for school choice problems with weak priorities to simplify the stable improvement cycles algorithm proposed by Erdil and Ergin [8].

    Econometric Institute, Erasmus University Rotterdam, 3000 DR Rotterdam, The Netherlands,

    Institute of Health Policy and Management, Erasmus University Rotterdam, 3000 DR Rotterdam, The Netherlands,

    Econometric Institute, Erasmus University Rotterdam, 3000 DR Rotterdam, The Netherlands
    Abstract Barter exchange markets are markets in which agents seek to directly trade their goods with each other. Exchanges occur in cycles or in chains in which each agent gives a good to the next agent. Kidney exchange is an important type of barter exchange market that allows incompatible patient–donor pairs to exchange kidneys so the involved patients can receive a transplant. The clearing problem is to find an allocation of donors to patients that is optimal with respect to multiple criteria. To achieve the best possible score on all criteria, long cycles and chains are often needed, particularly when there are many hard-to-match patients. In this paper we show why this may pose difficulties for existing approaches to the optimization of kidney exchanges. We then present a generic iterative branch-and-price algorithm that can deal effectively with multiple criteria, and we show how the pricing problem may be solved in polynomial time for a general class of criteria. Our algorithm is effective even for large, realistic patient–donor pools. Our approach and its effects are demonstrated by using simulations with kidney exchange data from the Netherlands and the United States.

    Saturday, November 22, 2014

    Mini course in market design: video of the short course (4 lectures) I gave in Brazil

    Here is the link to lecture 1 of 4, with links to the other three lectures as well.

    IWGTS 2014 - Mini-course: Market Design

    These lectures were delivered as part of the  Conference on game theory in honor of Marilda Sotomayor: July 2014.

    Friday, November 21, 2014

    Pope Francis on euthanasia and in vitro fertilization

    In connection with recent developments concerning medically assisted suicide/death with dignity, the Catholic Church has strongly reaffirmed its opposition to that and other repugnant transactions, particularly involving reproduction.

    Pope Francis denounces euthanasia as 'sin against God'. The Pope strongly condemns the 'right to die' movement, and warns against abortion, IVF and stem cell research

    "Pope Francis denounced the right to die movement on Saturday, saying that euthanasia is a sin against God and creation.

    "The Latin American pontiff said it was a “false sense of compassion” to consider euthanasia as an act of dignity.

    "Earlier this month, the Vatican’s top bioethics official condemned as “reprehensible” the death by assisted suicide of a 29-year-old American woman, Brittany Maynard, who was suffering terminal brain cancer and said she wanted to die with dignity.

    “This woman (took her own life) thinking she would die with dignity, but this is the error,” said Monsignor Ignacio Carrasco de Paula, the head of the Pontifical Academy for Life.

    “Suicide is ... a bad thing because it is saying no to life and to everything it means with respect to our mission in the world and towards those around us,” he said, describing assisted suicide as “an absurdity”.
    "The Pope also condemned in vitro fertilization, describing it as “the scientific production of a child” and embryonic stem cell research, which he said amounted to “using human beings as laboratory experiments to presumably save others.”

    “This is playing with life,” he said. “Beware, because this is a sin against the creator, against God the creator.”

    "The Pope considers the assisted suicide movement as a symptom of a contemporary “throw-away culture” that views the sick and elderly as a drain on society.

    "Francis urged doctors to take “courageous and against-the-grain” decisions to uphold church teaching on the dignity of life."

    Thursday, November 20, 2014

    Congestion and signaling in college admissions

    The college application season is approaching, and Ariel Kaminer in the NY Times notes the stress and congestion: Applications by the Dozen, as Anxious Seniors Hedge College Bets

    "For members of the class of 2015 who are looking at more competitive colleges, their overtaxed counselors say, 10 applications is now commonplace; 20 is taking on a familiar ring; even 30 is not beyond imagining. And why stop there?
    "A spokeswoman for Naviance, an online tool that many high school students and their counselors use to keep track of applications, said one current user’s “colleges I’m applying to” tab already included 60 institutions. Last year the record was 86, she said.

    "A number of factors have contributed to this rapid escalation.

    "One is the growing popularity of the Common Application, a standardized form that more than 500 colleges now honor, making the process of applying to multiple institutions far easier. Another is the tough economy, which drives students to look ever farther afield for a college that can meet their financial aid needs.

    "But perhaps the most pressing factor has been plain old fear.

    “Every year the story is that college is harder to get into, so kids panic and think they have to apply to more places,” said Jim Jump, academic dean and director of guidance at St. Christopher’s School in Richmond, Va. The resulting surfeit of applications drives acceptance rates down even further, making the next year’s high school seniors even more panicked.
    "According to the National Association for College Admission Counseling, in 1990 just 9 percent of students applied to seven or more colleges. By 2011, the year of its most recent survey, that group had risen to 29 percent.

    "In the class of 2014, according to Naviance, 16.5 percent of seniors using the system said they intended to apply to 11 to 20 colleges. (Naviance did not have figures on how many applications were actually filed.)
    "But the most compelling reason not to apply to dozens of colleges, counselors say, is that more applications do not necessarily mean better odds. “It’s not like the lottery,” said Michael Carter of St. Stephen’s & St. Agnes School in Alexandria, Va.

    "Ms. Sohmer said she had found that when students file 20 or more applications, “they’ve loaded on lots of ultracompetitive schools, so their list becomes disproportionately top-heavy. Or they throw in lots of schools at the end where they’re overqualified.” A far better way to increase one’s chances, she and many others agree, is to come up with a manageable but carefully selected list of schools and get serious about them.
    "As a result, many colleges have begun emphasizing “demonstrated interest” — tiny but telling indications of how badly students want to attend. “If they’re within a reasonable distance of the campus, did they visit?” asks Patrick O’Connor, associate dean of college counseling at the Cranbrook Kingswood Upper School in Bloomfield Hills, Mich. “Did they attend a college night and fill out a card? Have they contacted a rep to ask some legitimate questions?”

    Wednesday, November 19, 2014

    Who Gets What--And Why: The New Economics of Matching and Market Design

    I finally finished my book on market design for a general audience:) (except for copy editing and galleys which are still to come...) The publication date (at the moment) is June 2...

    Coming in June, my book :

    Here's the publisher's blurb:
    A Nobel laureate reveals the often surprising rules that govern a vast array of activities — both mundane and life-changing — in which money may play little or no role.

    If you’ve ever sought a job or hired someone, applied to college or guided your child into a good kindergarten, asked someone out on a date or been asked out, you’ve participated in a kind of market. Most of the study of economics deals with commodity markets, where the price of a good connects sellers and buyers. But what about other kinds of “goods,” like a spot in the Yale freshman class or a position at Google? This is the territory of matching markets, where “sellers” and “buyers” must choose each other, and price isn’t the only factor determining who gets what.

    Alvin E. Roth is one of the world’s leading experts on matching markets. He has even designed several of them, including the exchange that places medical students in residencies and the system that increases the number of kidney transplants by better matching donors to patients. In Who Gets What — And Why, Roth reveals the matching markets hidden around us and shows how to recognize a good match and make smarter, more confident decisions.

    Tuesday, November 18, 2014

    Matching and market design at the SAET conference in 2015 in Cambridge, UK

    Fuhito Kojima writes:

    I'm organizing a session at SAET conference 2015;
    and I'm wondering if you could spread the word through your blog, if you have a slot for an entry.
    I am planning a session on matching and market design, and have two slots for presentations left.
    Thanks a lot in advance!


    Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory

    15th SAET Conference on Current Trends in Economics
    University of Cambridge, UK, July 27-31, 2015

    The 15th Annual SAET Conference will be held July 27-31, 2015 at the University of Cambridge, UK.

    Why some people don't register as deceased organ donors

    In The Atlantic, Tiffanie Wen reports: Why Don't People Want to Donate Their Organs?

    " In the United States alone, 21 people die everyday waiting for an organ transplant. Though about 45 percent of American adults are registered organ donors, it varies widely by state. More than 80 percent of adults in Alaska were registered donors in 2012, compared to only 12.7 percent in New York, for example. In New York alone, there are more than 10,000 people currently waiting for organ transplants. According to data compiled by the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, more than 500 people died in New York last year, waiting for an organ to become available.

    "Given this shortage of organs, why don’t more people donate?

    "It’s a touchy question, something non-donors aren’t necessarily keen to answer. But experts say there is a large disparity between the number of people who say that they support organ donation in theory and the number of people who actually register. In the U.K., for example, more than 90 percent of people say they support organ donation in opinion polls, but less than one-third are registered donors. What keeps well-intentioned people from ultimately donating is something that academics, doctors, and organ-donation activists are trying to figure out.

    "In a recent literature review, researchers at the University of Geneva examined several social and psychological reasons why people choose not to donate, either by not registering as an organ donor during their lives, or electing not to donate the organs of their next of kin.

    "The study cites mistrust in the medical field and lack of understanding about brain death as major barriers to donation. A 2002 study in Australia, for example, illustrates the controversy surrounding brain death. Some participants indicated that they wouldn’t donate the organs of their next of kin if his or her heart were still beating, even if they were proclaimed brain-dead.

    "Studies have also shown that the less people trust medical professionals, the less likely they are to donate. The mistrust can come from personal experience—one study in New York showed, for example, that next of kin who perceived a lower quality of care during a loved one’s final days were less likely to consent to donation—or from misconceptions about how the medical community treats registered organ donors.

    “There are a lot of people who subscribe to the belief that if a doctor knows you are a registered donor, they won’t do everything they can to save your life,” says Brian Quick, an associate professor of communication at the University of Illinois."

    HT: Zeeshan Butt

    Monday, November 17, 2014

    Matchmakers for religious schools in Israel

    Assaf Romm writes

    "The following article in Hebrew tells the story of the Haredi (ultra orthodox jewish) "yeshiva ktana" (=~ elementary school) students and the way they get accepted into "yeshiva gdola" (=~ high school):

    The interesting parts are that there are many-to-one matchmakers that make a lot of money by cutting deals between students and high schools, and between elementary schools and high schools. For example, a deal can be getting a group of students from the same elementary school in which there are 12 excellent students and 3 mediocre students to an excellent high school, or paying the matchmaker certain amount of money for convincing excellent students to come to a certain high school. There are also reports of some of the students joining in by going to the matchmakers/elementary school teachers and asking to share the profit. Finally, there are also some mentions of unraveling, and an agreement to not start recruiting students before a certain date.

    My thoughts about this: a centralized computer system might not be a good idea in this case, because of this population's complete mistrust in technology, because there isn't any centralized organization that governs all these activities, and because the transfers may make it very hard to achieve near-strategyproofness for both sides, which could be extremely important here."

    Sunday, November 16, 2014

    Repugnant transactions: the right to say "God" in Malay

    Thomas Fuller has the story in the NY Times: The Right to Say ‘God’ Divides a Diverse Nation

    This is one of those stories whose URL is more informative than the headline:

    "According to a series of government orders and rulings by Malaysia’s Islamic councils, the word for God in the Malay language — “Allah” — is reserved for Muslims. Malay-language Bibles are banned everywhere except inside churches. State regulations ban a list of words, including Allah, in any non-Muslim context."

    Saturday, November 15, 2014

    Interview on market design

    Here's an interview I did with a British financial reporter, Vikas Shah: Is It Time to Re-Design our Markets?

    Friday, November 14, 2014

    More on Nimrod Megiddo winning the INFORMS von Neumann Theory Prize

    Here's the citation for Nimrod Megiddo winning the John von Neumann Theory Prize

    John von Neumann Theory Prize

    2014 Winner(s): Nimrod Megiddo, IBM
    Of all of the areas in which he has worked, Megiddo has had perhaps the most profound impact on the theory of linear programming. His work on the probabilistic analysis of the simplex method, alone and with Adler, established some of the most important results in the area, including the best (quadratic) bound for the complexity of a complete parametric pivoting method and an explanation of why this is possible for the lexicographic version but not the standard Lemke perturbation. He also established a quadratic lower bound for this method. This, along with work of Smale, Borgwardt, and Haimovich, together with independent proofs of the quadratic result by Adler-Karp-Shamir and Todd provided the first theoretical justification for the success of the simplex method. 
    Megiddo was an early leader in the theory of interior-point methods, and laid the framework for the development of primal-dual methods in his seminal paper on pathways to the solution. This paper was the foundation for the hugely successful primal-dual interior-point methodology for linear programming, implementations of which are now included in every serious software package. His contributions to interior-point methods culminated in his work on the linear complementarity problem with Kojima and Noma. 
    Megiddo’s work has also played a role in highlighting the question, still unresolved today, of whether there is a strongly polynomial algorithm for linear programming. Megiddo made two strikingly beautiful contributions in the design of strongly polynomial algorithms: his innovative multi-dimensional searching technique that yielded a strongly polynomial algorithm for linear programming in constant dimensions, and its forerunner in parametric search algorithms, which showed how to leverage an algorithm to optimize a linear objective into a corresponding strongly polynomial algorithm to optimize a rational objective function over the same feasible region. 
    In algorithmic game theory, Megiddo has done groundbreaking work that anticipated by two decades the more recent blossoming of the field. In particular, Megiddo raised the question of the complexity of equilibrium computation in the 80’s and showed that the usual notion of NPhardness is not adequate to capture the apparent difficulty of the problem, anticipating and opening the way to subsequent developments in the area. On the algorithmic side, his later work (with Kholler and von Stengel) also showed how equilibrium solutions for 2-person games can be computed in polynomial time, even if the game were given in extensive form. Bridging between concepts in game theory and traditional combinatorial optimization, Megiddo initiated the investigation of computing fair flows in networks, and did path-setting work on efficient algorithms to compute the fair allocation of costs in a number of game-theoretic settings. 
    In summary, Nimrod Megiddo has made fundamental contributions across a broad range of areas of operations research and management science, most notably in linear programming, combinatorial optimization, and algorithmic game theory. His work has been highly influential, in both identifying key concepts and in developing new algorithmic approaches for fundamental problems.

    Thursday, November 13, 2014

    An open letter supporting experiments on providing benefits to kidney donors

    An open letter to President Obama and Congress calls for pilot studies on the effects of providing benefits to kidney donors.

    An Open Letter to President Barack Obama, Secretary of Health and Human Services Sylvia Mathews Burwell, Attorney General Eric Holder and Leaders of Congress

    Here are the conclusions, and the list of initiating signers

    We applaud the President’s declaration that 2014 is a “year of action” when he will use executive powers and the regulatory process to ensure the health and well-being of Americans and end unnecessary health expenditures. As part of this process, we call on the President to take executive action on organ transplantation and initiate pilot studies on benefits to donors.
    We call on HHS to develop the necessary regulatory process for conducting such studies and to implement them.
    We call on the Attorney General to smooth the way for such pilot programs by recognizing that they are consistent with the intent of the National Organ Transplant Act.
    Finally, we call on Congress to pass legislation that allocates the necessary funding for these programs and clears the way for their implementation.
    Kidney disease has for too long been neglected by all branches of government. It is time to act.
    Initiating signers*:

    Nir Eyal, Associate Professor of Global Health and Social Medicine, Harvard Medical School and Harvard University
    Julio Frenk, Dean, Harvard School of Public Health, Harvard University
    Michele B. Goodwin, Chancellor’s Chair in Law, University of California-Irvine Law School
    Lori Gruen, Professor of Philosophy, Feminist, Gender, and Sexuality Studies, and Environmental Studies at Wesleyan University
    The Very Reverend Gary R. Hall, Dean, Washington Cathedral
    Douglas W. Hanto, Professor of Surgery and Associate Director Vanderbilt Transplant Center, Vanderbuilt University, Tennessee
    Frances Kissling, President, The Center for Health, Ethics and Social Policy
    Ruth Macklin, Professor of Bioethics, Albert Einstein College of Medicine
    Steven Pinker, Johnstone Family Professor, Department of Psychology, Harvard University
    Lloyd E. Ratner, Professor of Surgery, Columbia University
    Harold T. Shapiro, President Emeritus, Princeton University
    Peter Singer, Ira W. DeCamp Professor of Bioethics, Princeton University
    Andrew W. Torrance, Professor of Law, University of Kansas and Visiting Scholar MIT Sloan School of Management
    Robert D. Truog, Director, Center for Bioethics, Harvard University, Harvard Medical School
    Robert M. Veatch, Professor of Medical Ethics at the Kennedy Institute of Ethics, Georgetown University

    Together with the long list of other signers, the letter has a lot of support from a diverse group of people, including many transplant professionals who I know and respect. It's a sign that the discussion is changing.

    Wednesday, November 12, 2014

    Market design in Spanish: Diseño de Mercados by Alvin E. Roth, Gary E. Bolton and Paul Klemperer

    Here is a book on market design in Spanish that arrived unexpectedly in my mailbox: it's by me, Gary Bolton and Paul Klemperer.

    You can buy it here (it's cheap, if you read Spanish).

    It was unexpected because I didn't know that the first three chapters of the Handbook of Market Design were being translated to form this much briefer new book.

    Roth, Alvin E. Gary E. Bolton, and Paul Klemperer, “Diseño de Mercados,” Breviarios del Fondo de Cultura Economica, Mexico, Translated by Karina Azanza, Maria Teresa Franco Gonzalez, and Brian McDougall (2014) [Spanish translation of Chapters 1-3 of The Handbook of Market Design. 

    Tuesday, November 11, 2014

    Possibilities for kidney exchange in Mexico

    Last week Mike Rees and I spoke at the Centro Medico ABC in Mexico City, to try to help them organize kidney exchange in Mexico.  I'm looking forward to seeing what develops...

    Here is some media coverage in Spanish...I can't tell (from Google translate) how clearly various conversations are reported...since I don't speak Spanish, some interviews were also conducted through translators.

    Alvin Roth y su mercado de riñones

    DISEÑÓ Y ARMÓ UN MERCADO DE RIÑONES FUNCIONALLas repugnantes transacciones 
de Alvin Roth

    Radio interview
    El Premio Nobel de Economía 2012 viene a contarnos sobre un nuevo esquema para resolver el problema de donación de órganos.

    Promueven en México intercambio de riñón para trasplante

    photographic agency seems to be selling photos from the talk I gave at the hospital, at 

    Update: here are other news stories with maybe some confusion in the first about the connection between kidney exchange and repugnant transactions...
    Nobel de economía diseña mercado de riñones para salvar más vidas

    Premio Nobel de Economía al servicio de la medicina 

    Monday, November 10, 2014

    Nimrod Megiddo awarded the John von Neumann Theory Prize at INFORMS 2014

    Nimrod Megiddo was announced as the winner of the 2014 von Neumann Theory Prize at the INFORMS meeting yesterday (although as of this writing the web page hasn't been updated).

    He is a deserving member of a distinguished club:

    Past Awardees

    2013 Winner(s)
    Michel L Balinski, C.N.R.S. and Ecole Polytechnique
    2012 Winner(s)
    George L. Nemhauser, Georgia Institute of TechnologyLaurence A. Wolsey, Université Catholique de Louvain
    2011 Winner(s)
    Gerard P. Cornuejols, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business
    2010 Winner(s)
    Peter Glynn, Stanford UniversitySøren Asmussen, Aarhus University, Denmark
    2009 Winner(s)
    Yurii Nesterov, CORE/UCLYinyu Ye, Stanford University, Department of Management Science & Engineering
    2008 Winner(s)
    Frank P. Kelly, Centre for Mathematical Science, University of Cambridge
    2007 Winner(s)
    Arthur F. Veinott, Jr., Stanford University
    2006 Winner(s)
    Martin Grötschel, ZIB
    László Lovász, Eotvos University, Institute of MathematicsAlexander Schrijver, CWI, National Research Institute for Mathematics & Computer Science
    2005 Winner(s)
    Robert J. Aumann, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Center for Rationality
    2004 Winner(s)
    J. Michael Harrison, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business
    2003 Winner(s)
    Arkadi Nemirovski, Georgia Institute of Technology, School of ISyEMichael J. Todd, Cornell University
    School of Operations Research and Information
    2002 Winner(s)
    Cyrus Derman, Professor Operations Research, Columbia UniversityDonald L. Iglehart, Stanford University
    2001 Winner(s)
    Ward Whitt, Columbia University, Industrial Engineering & Operations Research Dept.
    2000 Winner(s)
    Ellis L. Johnson, School of Industrial & Systems Engineering, Georgia Institute of TechnologyManfred W. Padberg, New York University, Stern School of Business
    1999 Winner(s)
    R. Tyrrell Rockafellar, University of Washington, Dept. of Mathematics
    1998 Winner(s)
    Fred W. Glover, OptTek Systems, Inc.
    1997 Winner(s)
    Peter Whittle
    1996 Winner(s)
    Peter C. Fishburn
    1995 Winner(s)
    Egon Balas, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business
    1994 Winner(s)
    Lajos Takacs
    1993 Winner(s)
    Robert Herman, University of Texas-Austin
    1992 Winner(s)
    Alan J. Hoffman, IBMPhilip S. Wolfe, IBM
    1991 Winner(s)
    Richard E. Barlow, University of California-BerkeleyFrank Proschan
    1990 Winner(s)
    Richard M. Karp, University of California - Berkeley, Dept. of Electrical Engineering & Computer Science
    1989 Winner(s)
    Harry M. Markowitz , Baruch College
    1988 Winner(s)
    Herbert A. Simon
    1987 Winner(s)
    Samuel Karlin , Stanford University
    Dept of Mathematics
    1986 Winner(s)
    Kenneth J. Arrow , Stanford University, Dept. of Economics
    1985 Winner(s)
    Jack Edmonds, University of Waterloo, Dept. of Combinatorics & Optimization
    1984 Winner(s)
    Ralph E. Gomory , Alfred P. Sloan Foundation
    1983 Winner(s)
    Herbert E. Scarf, Yale University
    1982 Winner(s)
    Abraham CharnesWilliam W. Cooper, University of Texas - Austin, MSIS DepartmentRichard J. Duffin
    1981 Winner(s)
    Lloyd S. Shapley , University of California - Los Angeles, Dept. of Economics
    1980 Winner(s)
    David GaleHarold W. Kuhn, Princeton UniversityAlbert W. Tucker
    1979 Winner(s)
    David Blackwell , University of California - Berkeley
    1978 Winner(s)
    John F. Nash, Princeton University, Mathematics Dept.Carlton E. Lemke
    1977 Winner(s)
    Felix Pollaczek
    1976 Winner(s)
    Richard Bellman
    1975 Winner(s)
    George B. Dantzig, Stanford University