Showing posts with label sociology. Show all posts
Showing posts with label sociology. Show all posts

Sunday, May 14, 2023

Morality in Economics, as viewed from Sociology (Georg Kanitsar in European J. of Sociology)

Georg Kanitsar, a young sociologist, undertakes the task of looking at how economists think about morality (with a focus on experimental and behavioral econ, and market design). His view of how economists think may shed some light (for economists) on how sociologists think. (I quote below from near the beginning and near the end of his paper.)

Kanitsar, G. (2023). Putting Morals into Economics: From Value Neutrality to the Moral Economy and the Economization of Morality. European Journal of Sociology / Archives Européennes De Sociologie, 1-30. doi:10.1017/

"Abstract: The economic discipline plays a performative role in constructing the moral order of market society. Yet, little attention has been paid to what economists explicitly regard as moral or how they conceive of morality. This article reflects a recent attempt to put morals into economics, that is, to introduce morality as a research topic in behavioural and experimental economics. It maps three research programs that theorize the moral economy. The programs emphasize the moral foundations of market society, the moral limits of market expansion, and the moral consequences of market trading and, thus, appear irreconcilable with classifications of economists as market enthusiasts or moral agnostics. At the same time, however, the literature centres on an “economized” form of morality that is corrective to market inefficiencies, attributed to the responsibility of the individual, and expressed in rational terms. In doing so, this literature contributes to redefining moral problems in economic terms."

"I consider efforts to incorporate morality into an economic framework advanced by two influential branches of the discipline—behavioural economics and market experiments. To gain an overview of relevant research in these branches, I assemble a database of 39 recent articles and identify 20 key articles among them.

...

I explore the “economization of morality” by elucidating the moral arguments and the moral background of two authoritative programs in present-day economics: behavioural economics/experiments and market design/experiments. While many renowned economists have produced notable work on morality, these two research programs currently exert a unique influence on the economic discipline and are highly industrious in exporting its findings to policy making.

...

"Discourse in the economic mainstream was long dominated by market enthusiasts and moral agnostics, but the recent surge of behavioural and market experiments has again drawn attention to morality as a research topic in economics. At the argumentative level, the reviewed literature reveals a genuine break with market fundamentalism in the narrow sense. I have identified three strands that shed light on the moral economy and emphasize the moral foundations, limitations, and consequences of markets. Thus, economics has not been deaf to appeals to “put morals into markets” [Amable Reference Amable2011]. At the background level, however, the integration of morality is steered by the discipline’s theoretical and methodological underpinnings. In consequence, a very specific understanding of morality lies at the heart of these research efforts; a form of morality that is functional to market efficiency and attributed to utility-maximizing individuals.

...

"Behavioural economics thus strikes out in the opposite direction as scholarship in economic sociology. On the surface, both disciplines take as a starting point a view of market society as divided in arm’s-length transactions and social ties, and both disciplines have rediscovered morality as their subject matter. Yet, behavioural economics addresses the social sphere with tools that were tailor-made for the neoclassical analysis of markets. The field maintains the analytical primacy on efficiency and rationality, which it inherited from its parent discipline. In experiments, social exchanges are represented as contractual, anonymous, and temporary encounters, and money is regarded as a neutral tool used to express valuations. Conversely, economic sociology views markets as diverse “arenas of social interaction” [Beckert Reference Beckert2009: 245]. Market transactions are considered as far from universal, arelational, and disembedded [Aspers Reference Aspers, Beckert and Zafirovski2005], and the cultural meanings of money rarely reduce it to a qualityless, neutral, and homogenous medium of exchange [Zelizer Reference Zelizer1989]. Thus, the “moral economy” of behavioural economics is situated next to the “amoral economy” of neoclassical economics [Bowles Reference Bowles2016], echoing the traditional opposition between separate spheres of the economic and the moral [Thompson Reference Thompson E1971]. By contrast, economic sociology is increasingly devoted to identifying the multiple moralities underlying economic processes [Beckert Reference Beckert2012; Zelizer Rotman Reference Zelizer Rotman2017], convinced that “all economies are moral economies” [Fourcade Reference Fourcade2017: 665]."

Friday, August 12, 2022

Are sociology and economics coming closer together? Philippe Steiner in Acta Oeconomica

 Professor Philippe Steiner, of the Groupe d’Etudes des Méthodes de l’Analyse Sociologique de la Sorbonne, thinks that these days sociology and economics may be coming closer to each other than they have for some time.

New economic sociology and economic theory by Philippe Steiner, Acta Oeconomica 72 (2022) S1, 23–40  DOI: 10.1556/032.2022.00017

"Abstract: The paper begins with a brief reminder of the origin of economic sociology. It then surveys research by economic sociologists from the 1980s to the present, with a focus on their relation to political economy, which ranges from close to arm's length. Finally, beyond any differences between economic theory and economic sociology, the paper considers how both approaches can be connected in the socio-historical and economic study of economic inequalities by Thomas Piketty, and the use of matching markets by Alvin Roth."

...

"In the final part the paper seeks to show that economists have developed approaches that permit a fruitful combination of sociology and political economy, even using some of the more technical aspects of modern economics.

...

"After the 1930s economic sociology lost its appeal for economists, as well as sociologists, and gave way to the “Parsonian peace” according to which economists deal with value, while sociologists deal with values (Stark 2009: 7).

...

"There was a revival of economic sociology during the 1970s on both sides of the Atlantic. In the United States, this began with Mark Granovetter’s work on the labor market (Granovetter 1974), and then with a new interpretation of the social embeddedness of the market (Granovetter 1985). This was something that Polanyi had stressed in his book, noting the catastrophic consequences that follow the management of humanity, nature and politics as if they were market goods (labor, land and money) regulated by “supply and demand” in their respective markets. In the same period, Viviana Zelizer (1979, 1985) brought the sociology of culture closer to the sociology of economic life. In Europe, Pierre Bourdieu proposed a new interpretation of the market for cultural goods (or symbolic goods), to explain the functioning of the art market (Bourdieu 1971).

"As regards the relation to economic theory, the new economic sociology unfolds along four axes: (i) Granovetter established a close and direct relationship between economic sociology and the neo-classical theory of job search, together with the theory of transaction costs; (ii) Zelizer distanced herself completely from economic theory, although her sociology of economic life deals with central economic phenomena such as insurance, money, and law; (iii) Neil Fligstein developed an economic sociology close to institutionalist political economy, focusing on key institutions of the market, notably those regulating competition; finally, (iv) Bourdieu employed an original conceptualization of fields in order to explain the functioning of the markets of symbolic goods (fashion, painting, literature), while at the same time developing a methodological criticism of economic theory.

...

"In the case of the creation of the life insurance market in the United States, Zelizer started from the following paradox: while changes in social structure – fewer landowners, less mutual aid between neighbors – made it increasingly rational to insure one’s life to avoid leaving one’s wife and children destitute in the event of premature death, the life insurance market remained sluggish during the 19th century compared to what it was in Great Britain and in France. How do we explain this apparent lack of self-interested behavior in American male breadwinners? Zelizer’s answer employed several cultural arguments, including one based on the relationship to religion. During this period there was a widespread idea that to insure oneself against premature death was to oppose the will of God, even to not trust his wisdom. This was the reason for the reluctance to accept this new market product, the life insurance contract. A strength of her argument is also that she is careful not to oppose social behavior and self-interested economic behavior head-on. In fact, two phenomena directly linked to religion intervene to modify this cultural relationship to life insurance. First, she points to the fact that the religious sects that sent pastors to frontier regions took out life insurance on them so that the sect would not have to take care of their families if they died – a financial interest played its part in religious institutions. Second, she notes a reversal in the religious discourse on life insurance. In the beginning of the 20th century not only preachers, but also the rhetoric of insurance salesmen emphasized that the good father is he who takes precautions against premature death, hence this good father must be insured. Both culture and the economy began to structure behaviors that promoted a developing insurance market.

...

"While economists continued to employ the hypothesis of rationality, this is no longer central to the discourse of economic sociologists; the idea that economists are remote from the historical and social dimension has also lost its intensity. Instead, other criticisms have emerged, especially associated with the idea of performativity. At present there is neither conflict, or mutual indifference. Indeed, in several fields there are signs of an explicit or implicit rapprochement. I would like to mention two in particular.

"First of all, given the capacity of modern computers to process large databases, economists can deploy econometric tools in ways that accurately account for historical and social facts, as Thomas Piketty (1998, 2013, 2019) does. Second, by pursuing the strategy of economic engineering proposed by Alvin Roth (2002), economists take up the practical work of constructing institutions of exchange, exemplified by design economics and matching markets economists, developing what sociological economists have called the economic performation of the economy by economics (Callon 1998; MacKenzie et al. 2007)"

**********

Earlier

Thursday, January 6, 2022

Thursday, January 6, 2022

The design and performation of markets: a discussion, by Michel Callon and Alvin Roth in the AMS Review

 The AMS Review, a journal of the American Marketing Society, has put together an issue on the theory of markets.  When I was approached by Professor Hans Kjellberg to contribute a paper, I replied that I would rather engage in a dialog with one of the other proposed contributors, the great French economic sociologist Michel Callon.  Professor Kjellberg conveyed that proposal to Professor Callon, and so it was that we corresponded by email, over a pandemic year and a half.  Professor Kjellberg edited the emails to make an article of them, and also wrote an introduction. Here they are (still behind a paywall).

Kjellberg, H. Market expertise at work: introducing Alvin E. Roth and Michel Callon. AMS Rev (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13162-021-00217-9

Callon, M., Roth, A.E. The design and performation of markets: a discussion. AMS Rev (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13162-021-00216-w

"This discussion between Alvin Roth and Michel Callon is the result of a series of e-mail exchanges over the course of 18 months. It was triggered by an invitation extended to both authors to contribute to this special section of AMS Review on theories of markets. The discussion starts off with direct responses to the question put by Hans Kjellberg in his preceding commentary, which introduces the work of Roth and Callon, respectively. Then follows a discussion that touches upon, develops, and clarifies a number of issues related to the two authors’ respective positions on and approaches to markets and their organizing."

********

Professor Kjellberg asked each of us to begin the exchange by answering the question "Why and how did you come to work on market design and the performativity of economics, respectively? "

Here are some paragraphs excerpted from the first and last paragraphs of my answer:

"I received my Ph.D. in Operations Research (OR) in 1974. (That "7" makes it sound as if it were a long time ago…) I studied game theory, and in those days, before game theory blossomed in economics, it seemed that it would find a natural home in OR. I’ve sometimes been asked how I switched from OR to ECON, and my answer is that I just stayed where I was as the disciplinary boundaries shifted around me. 

"Even though market design (or marketplace design) wasn’t yet recognized as a part of economics, game theory was its natural starting place.

...

"I was privileged to be involved in the first kidney exchange between the United Arab Emirates and Israel in the summer of 2021 (della Cava, 2021; Roth, 2021). That exchange shows that kidney exchange, and markets more generally, can do more than save lives and promote health and welfare, and are not just the fruits of peace: they can also help make and solidify peace. (Perhaps Michel would say that peace is one of the social arrangements that promote markets, and well-designed markets are among the social arrangements that promote peace.)

"The Covid pandemic shed light on the fact that even when in normal times there is social support for using money as a primary way to allocate many scarce goods, in an emergency this social support can be strained. When masks, ventilators, and vaccines were in short supply, there was no widespread attempt to allocate them within countries primarily to those who could pay the most. That is, in emergencies it can be both operationally difficult and socially repugnant to rely on prices to allocate scarce goods, and so markets sometimes need to shift from their normal design to an emergency mode (Cramton et al., 2020). Thus after natural disasters, we often see rationing, price controls, subsidies and other temporary interventions.

"This should help us keep in mind that marketplaces are human artifacts: they are tools. When well designed to meet the needs of the larger environment in which they operate, they may work well, and when they are not, they may need to be redesigned. So, market design, and “design economics” more generally, can be thought of as the engineering part of game theory. Michel’s work on “performativity” in economics can help expand on this distinction between science and engineering.

"In short, market design, which is an ancient human activity, is naturally studied by economists, engineers, sociologists, and marketers, and is intimately involved with the human experience. I hope you can see why I couldn’t resist being drawn in."

***********

On related matters:

Professor Callon has a book newly translated into English:

Markets in the Making: Rethinking Competition, Goods, and Innovation, by Michel Callon, Translated by Olivia Custer, Edited by Martha Poon, Princeton University Press, Published (US): Dec 7, 2021.

Here's my blurb for the book:

"“In Markets in the Making, Michel Callon explains the unique view of markets he has distilled from his long career observing markets, in detail, from the perspective of an engineer-sociologist. In a book that will fascinate economists as well as sociologists, he introduces us to a new vocabulary to help us think about markets whose participants may be collectives, and whose infrastructure helps participants determine what they want, and calculate what they need.”—Alvin Roth, Nobel Memorial prize winner for economics and Craig and Susan McCaw Professor of Economics, Stanford University"

***********

And here are some of my other posts on sociology and economics from the point of view of performativity.  Here's one of those that may have first planted the seed for my desire to correspond with Michel Callon, it's a link to a blog post of Jose Ossandon:

Thursday, April 11, 2013

************
(this post "The design and performation of markets: a discussion, by Michel Callon and Alvin Roth in the AMS Review" appeared for a few hours as if published on 6 December rather than 6 January, due to a keyboarding error...:(

Tuesday, September 21, 2021

Modern peer review: how it evolved since the 1950's in Sociology

 Peer review is a big part of the design of modern academic publishing in scholarly journals. It wasn't always that way, and the current peer review system is pretty modern. Here's an account of its development in the discipline of Sociology, since the 1950's (which is similar to what we see in Economics, except that it appears Sociology relies substantially more on double-blind reviews).

Merriman, B. Peer Review as an Evolving Response to Organizational Constraint: Evidence from Sociology Journals, 1952–2018. The American Sociologist 52, 341–366 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12108-020-09473-x

"Abstract: Double-blind peer review is a central feature of the editorial model of most journals in sociology and neighboring social scientific fields, yet there is little history of how and when its main features developed. Drawing from nearly 70 years of annual reports of the editors of American Sociological Association journals, this article describes the historical emergence of major elements of editorial peer review. These reports and associated descriptive statistics are used to show that blind review, ad hoc review, the formal requirement of exclusive submission, routine use of the revise and resubmit decision, and common use of desk rejection developed separately over a period of decades. The article then argues that the ongoing evolution of the review model has not been driven by intellectual considerations. Rather, the evolution of peer review is best understood as the product of continuous efforts to steward editors’ scarce attention while preserving an open submission policy that favors authors’ interests."

From the introduction:

"In the main, editors are faculty members who operate a journal concurrently with ordinary work responsibilities; some receive modest, fixed remuneration, but editors have no strong financial interest in the journals they edit, and commonly serve for fixed or periodically renewed terms. (For most current journals, the economic interest rests primarily with one of a handful of large commercial publishers.) Journals do not restrict submissions by status criteria such as institutional affiliation or academic rank, and submission ordinarily carries little or no money cost, even at journals where authors assume a large part of the eventual expense of publication. Authors are expected to submit a given work exclusively to a single journal. After initial screening, submissions to a typical journal undergo double-blind review, in which the identities of authors and reviewers are not known to one another. Most evaluations of submitted manuscripts are produced by scholars who are not part of the appointed editorial staff of the journal. Work that is published has ordinarily undergone at least one formal round of revision and resubmission in response to the substance of external evaluations.

...

"At ASA journals, blind review, external review, exclusive submission, the formal revise and resubmit decision, and a developmental (rather than advisory) model of assessment developed in succession over a period of more than 30 years. In the twenty-first Century, persistent difficulties in obtaining timely reviews prompted a rapid, order of magnitude increase in frequency of rejections without review, commonly called desk rejections. Blind review was the only feature of the present model adopted at an ASA journal with an explicitly stated, unambiguously intellectual aim. This article argues that the other features of the current peer review model emerged as improvised efforts to balance two competing organizational imperatives: editors must steward scarce time and attention, but have also sought to render reasonably timely decisions without a priori exclusion of large numbers of prospective authors or capricious rejection of submissions. This pattern in journal operations in many ways reflects larger structural changes in sociology: rapid expansion of the field in the mid-to-late twentieth Century was succeeded by increasing competition in the academic labor market and heightened publishing expectations for tenure and promotion."

A snippet from the body of the paper:

"Ad hoc review, in which manuscripts are referred to scholars not formally affiliated with the journal organization, did not become an integral feature of the ordinary reviewing process until the early 1970s. Before then, virtually all evaluations were produced by members of journal editorial boards. Exclusive submission to a single journal also did not become a rule until the 1970s, and there is suggestive evidence that simultaneous submission to multiple journals may have been somewhat common until that time.

"At first, reviewing was plainly intended to aid to the work of the editor; the occasional value of reviews to authors was taken as an incidental benefit. The evolution of a developmental model of review oriented toward the author was gradual, as was the emergence of the revise and resubmit decision as a nearly unavoidable intermediate step on the path to publication."

...

And in conclusion:

"A primary constraint on editorial innovation is, of course, the professional and status structure of academic disciplines. An extensive body of research on disciplines, and on higher educational institutions more generally, has shown a powerful isomorphic tendency: such structures tend to converge on a given form of practice even if all the actors are wholly aware of its inadequacies. Further, change in such practices will, under most circumstances, be slow: individual academic advancement involves regularly submitting oneself to the judgment of the more experienced members of a discipline according to the standards those more experienced scholars impose. Those who may have the freshest view of an intellectual field, and perhaps a greater impulse to explore new lines of work, also face the strongest pressures to invest their time and effort conservatively in the oldest means of publicizing their work.

"Efforts to change publishing norms therefore stand a much greater chance of success if they are adopted first, or early, by actors who occupy central places in a field, or if they are given the strong, credible endorsement of such actors (Starbuck 2016: 178). Conversations about academic publishing models, especially their relative unresponsiveness to changing circumstances in the twenty-first Century, often possess a degree of fatalism. But the development of editorial peer review itself is an important reminder of how rapidly a good idea may spread."


HT: Retraction Watch

Monday, November 30, 2020

Philippe Steiner on matching and romance, and transplants

 The French economic sociologist Philippe Steiner, who studies (among other things) how markets and gift giving can coexist, has a short piece about dating platforms.

Plateformes d’appariement, rencontres amoureuses et mondes marchands ("Matching platforms, romantic encounters and trading worlds") by Philippe Steiner, Dans Revue Française de Socio-Économie 2020/2 (n° 25), pages 161 à 166

Via google translate:

"Two elements can serve to close this brief reflection on the meeting of economic sociology and the sociology of sexuality.

"The appearance of a commercial intermediary modifies the social conditions of the romantic encounter. However, is it of a commercial nature? The use of the term matrimonial market, in which it is a question of "making a choice, maximizing your options and using calculation techniques in terms of costs and profits, and efficiency" [Illouz, 2006, p. 252], might lead one to believe. This interpretation is doubtful: if the market implies the idea of ​​choice, the converse is not true. The market relationship is characterized by monetary power, that is, the ability to obtain the desired good by paying more - it is not for nothing that auction technology is often taken as the example of the market. Also, once the relationship connecting individuals to the platform has brought together two potential partners, it is not the ability to pay that will make the match between them."

...

"Finally, the matching technologies that are at work in the platforms are not necessarily associated with the market world [Steiner, 2016, chap. 7]. Matching platforms using deferred acceptance or optimal trading cycle technologies can serve as well to reproduce the market functioning as to enable non-market matches. Alvin Roth's economic engineering applies to the labor market (pairing of medical interns and hospitals) as well as to organ transplantation, in which the commercial relationship is banned by national laws as well as by international declarations of professionals."

****************

The following interview may also be of interest to readers of this blog:

“Organic” Gift-Giving and Organ Transplantation, the Development of Economic Sociology and Morality in a Super-Monetized World: An Interview with Philippe Steiner Journal of Economic Sociology, 2014, vol. 15, issue 1, 11-19

 "when I studied the issue of organ transplantation, in full agreement with Healy’s approach, the organizational setting appeared to be very, very important. Accordingly, organ donation is a gift that individual actors provide to organizational actors. And then, with this gift, the organization conducts an extensive and very important process to ensure that the kidney does not convey illness, AIDS, cancer. In addition, the degree of compatibility between the organ and the body is checked. And they do this very rapidly. Then, they allocate the gift to a new individual actor. However, the important thing, in my opinion, is that between the first individual actor and the second one there is a large organization. More precisely, a plurality of organizations. This is something that I refer to in my present book as  organizational gift-giving”. To parallel the Durkheimian distinction between mechanical and organic solidarity, I would call this “organic” gift-giving and thus draw a distinction between the usual story about people in Melanesia who give gifts according to Malinowski and Mauss. 

...

" I am trying to map gift-giving, inheritance, and the exchange of symbolic goods, which are at the frontiers of usual market exchanges, to provide a broad view of what exchange at large means in our present society. Considering market exchange as a limited element of all the transactions in the world is my way to escape this super-monetized world.

...

"Social forces are pushing in the direction of a fullblown market society, whereas others are resisting and devoting their energy to maintaining a frontier between market exchanges and other forms of exchange. In that sense, political issues remain central, as in Polanyi’s time. To return to my research on organ transplantation, I would like to stress that the last chapter of the book concerns what is usually referred to as transplant tourism — is it good to have transplant tourism? Should it be fully legalized? Is the creation of a biomarket in India for Americans suffering from final-stage kidney failure a good thing? You must say yes or no. You cannot escape a political decision. And my answer was “Definitely, no biomarkets”. However, of course, this is not an easy position because as you know there are individuals who are dying because of the lack of kidneys. Therefore, this (response) is uncertain, difficult. However, in the end, not giving an answer is a boon to those pushing for the commodification of body parts. So, finally, I decided to stay on the Maussian–Polanyian side — “limit the market.”

Thursday, March 26, 2020

NSF report on Doctorate Recipients in the Social, Behavioral, and Economic Sciences (SBE): 2017

Here's the Doctorate Recipients in the Social, Behavioral, and Economic Sciences (SBE): 2017
NSF 20-310   |   March 16, 2020

There were almost 1,000 more doctorates awarded in Psychology in 2017 than the total in Economics plus Political Science plus Sociology.

I was surprised to note that the gender ratio of Economics doctorates is less extreme than that of Psychology doctorates, although in the opposite direction, and that Poli Sci doctorates are more evenly distributed between women and men (and the gender imbalance in Sociology is very close to Economics, also in the opposite direction.)


Here's a figure and a table from the pdf file.





Friday, March 13, 2020

The organ as a fictitious commodity, by Nicolas Brisset

Here, in French (and in English via Google Translate) an effort to understand, from writings on the subject, what underlies the widespread repugnance towards compensation for kidney donors, but mostly does not cause objections to kidney exchange.


L’organe comme marchandise fictive, Nicolas Brisset, Dans Actuel Marx 2020/1 (n° 67), pages 167 à 184
The organ as a fictitious commodity, Nicolas Brisset, In Actuel Marx 2020/1 (n ° 67) , pages 167 to 184

From the introduction:

"Finding out in the name of what individuals resist is an inexhaustible source of intuitions and reflections. Not that everything must be accepted as a whole, but understanding these moral systems is a necessary step from the perspective of both a social theory and a normative point of view on societal organization. We find in the history of social sciences several types of proposals in this regard  [5].
Our work will consist in starting from a social choice between two systems proposed to manage the distribution of a specific entity (the organ taken from living donors) in order to infer the moral foundations. In fact, in a 2007 issue of the Journal of Economic Perspective , two purely economic articles proposed very different ways of organizing the distribution of kidneys taken from living donors. On the one hand, Gary Becker and Julio Jorge Elìas proposed what seems at first sight (we will come back to this) to a trading system  On the other, Alvin Roth favored a system centered on organ donation  [7].
However, it turns out that one of these two proposals has been implemented in several countries, while the other seems for the moment to face a strong social rejection. Briefly, the trading system was rejected, while the donation-based system was retained. In this work, we will begin by analyzing the moral system that could have led to the rejection of the market solution in the context of the distribution of organs for the benefit of a system putting donation at the center. What is this rejection based on? We will try to decide between three hypotheses commonly put forward to explain the border between the merchant and the non-merchant. In turn, the use of money, the institution of the market and the problem of coercion were put forward as possible reasons for a refusal to market the organism."

and the Conclusion:
"The objective of this article has been limited, namely to show how the refusal of a method of matching, the organ market, could be understood as supported by a particular moral economy. The heart of the rejection seems to be that nobody would sell their organ if they weren't there obliged. A representation opposed to the idea according to which the prohibition of the markets to the organs would be inherently paternalistic. Here we find the heart of all debates relating to contested goods or activities. Prostitution, blood, gametes, surrogate mothers, the center of debate can be systematically summed up by the question: would these goods and services be produced and sold in the absence of a situation of loss of autonomy? We have seen that this question was also at the heart of Marxist historiography: to build capitalism is to build the political conditions for market efficiency in orienting work towards industrial activity. It seems that the only coherent explanation for the rejection of the market formulas proposed within the framework of the organs is precisely the rejection of such a construction."
**********

Professor Brisset has examined kidney exchange before--here's an earlier blog post with links to his work:

Wednesday, June 29, 2016

Thursday, January 30, 2020

More on social studies of markets--from José Ossandón

José Ossandón writes, in response to my earlier post about social studies of markets:

" I was very glad to find the post in your blog that mentions an special issue we edited in the journal Economy & Society (January 6th http://marketdesigner.blogspot.com/2020/01/social-studies-of-markets-marketplaces.html ). I was less happy though when I read that you found the whole thing too abstract and hard to follow.

Of course, the type of research-problem that motivate us are very different. While your object is the design of markets, we are trying to find out how to study market designers. But, I would hope you and your colleagues can also understand what we do. With this in mind, I wrote a summary, that ended in the five points below, trying to be as clear as possible. Hope these – certainly very sketchy - notes will make what concern us more understandable.

  1. Policy makers around the world increasingly rely on markets as solutions for the most various collective issues. We denominate markets that are also policy instruments ‘markets for collective concerns’. The increasing reliance on markets for collective concerns opens relevant questions for researchers in different social scientific disciplines.

  1. Historians of economic ideas, for instance, have pointed out that there has been a crucial transformation in the concept of market in economics. Few decades ago, markets were understood in opposition to organization and design. There was, on the one hand, the market as a form of spontaneous coordination, and, on the other, planned designed formal organization. Today, instead, markets are seen as object of design. This is not only a conceptual change. To use Ian Hacking’s categories, there has been a transition from description to intervention. Today, economists see the market as an object of engineering.

  1. To sociologists of work, it could be argued that what we see is the consolidation of a new profession. The historical intersection that generated the niche for the market designer is, perhaps paradoxically, not the success but the failure of markets. When markets originally created as policy instruments did not work as well as those who developed them expected to work (for example, school choice and competition didn’t simply increase quality of learning), decision makers didn’t go back to non-market instruments. Instead, they turned to experts in market repair. Market designers’ claim of professional jurisdiction, to use Andrew Abbott’s term, is that, to work properly markets require them.

  1. For economic sociologists, these developments trigger new problems. Traditionally, economic sociologists assume that one of their roles is to produce sociological definitions of the concept of market (i.e. if markets are a type of social formation: what are the basic elements that delimit markets as a particular social form?). Studying the market of market designers, however, requires a different stance. When studying market designers, the concept of markets is not something sociologists can define in advance, it becomes an empirical variable. Market designers are practitioners that mobilize different and varying conception of markets, and those who study them have to follow these modifications case to case.

  1. Finally, for scholars in science and technology studies, it becomes relevant to know more about the practice of market designers. Today, crucial matters of collective concern (for instance, a fairer and better school system, a solution for electronic waste, or how to build a more sustainable energy grid), depends, at least partially, on the work of experts on market design. As market designers are tasked with crucial collective responsibilities, it becomes very important to understand better issues like how these technical scientists conceive their vocation, the type of ethic of their work, and how they understand responsibility and collaboration.

Hope this helps and thanks a lot for keeping an interest in our work,

Best regards

José"

He also pointed me towards his paper

 Ossandón, José (2019) : Notes on market design and economic sociology,economic sociology_the european electronic newsletter, ISSN 1871-3351, Max Planck Institutefor the Study of Societies (MPIfG), Cologne, Vol. 20, Iss. 2, pp. 31-39,

which considers parallels between the social studies of markets and the growth of market design in economics.

Monday, January 6, 2020

Social studies of markets, marketplaces, and market design in the journal Economy and Society

Economists aren't the only social scientists who study markets and market-like institutions and organizations, and some of the study of markets by non-economists falls under the loose heading of 'Social studies of markets'.

The Journal Economy and Society  has a special issue on Markets for Collective Concerns and their Failures (Volume 48, 2019 - Issue 2).

The articles in the issue focus both on the social study of markets per se, and on critiquing the way such studies are conducted.

The introductory article, "The organization of markets for collective concerns and their failures," by Christian Frankel, José Ossandón & Trine Pallesen, all professors in the Department of Organization at Copenhagen Business School. summarizes the object of study by noting that
"Sociologists of different traditions share the view that part of their task is to provide definitions of markets." (emphasis added).

The concluding article, "On going the market one better: economic market design and the contradictions of building markets for public purposes,"  by Edward Nik-Khah and Philip Mirowski, criticizes social scientists for not taking sufficient account of market design, and criticizes market design for transforming markets from general purpose natural institutions into specialized human artifacts.

I find the level of abstraction in some of this work hard to follow. I guess I take it for granted that different markets are different, and that markets and marketplaces are (and always have been) human artifacts. (I agree though that sometimes other, more abstract simple views have held sway even among economists, and so I also agree that market design can take a bow for at least helping to add some nuance to the view that markets are simply emergent phenomena that arise without human intervention...)

But academic ideas influence popular ideas, and abstract ideas about markets have consequences. To paraphrase Keynes, I think it is sometimes the case that 'Practical men who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influence,' are sometimes influenced by ideas about "markets" in the abstract.  So I'll probably continue to try to follow this kind of work, although I'm often disappointed that it doesn't help me to better understand markets and marketplaces and their roles in society.

Here's the table of contents of the special issue.

Article
Pages: 153-174
Published online: 16 Jul 2019
OpenURL Stanford University
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Article
Pages: 175-196
Published online: 16 Jul 2019
OpenURL Stanford University
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Article
Pages: 221-242
Published online: 19 Jul 2019
OpenURL Stanford University
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Monday, November 7, 2016

Sociology of high frequency trading

The Journal Economy and Society has a special issue on Cultures of High-Frequency Trading, which includes the following articles:


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A related working paper I enjoyed reading, on Donald MacKenzie's website:

How Algorithms Interact: Goffman’s ‘Interaction Order’ in Automated Trading
Donald MacKenzie
April 2016